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Pleading and Access to Civil Justice:
A Response to Twiqbal Apologists
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A. Benjamin Spencer
ABSTRACT
Professor Stephen Yeazell once wrote, ''A society based on the rule of law fails in one of
its central premises if substantial parts of the population lack access to law enforcement
institutions."" One apparent threat to access to justice in recent years has been the
erosion of notice pleading in the federal courts in favor of a plausibility-pleading system
that screens out potentially meritorious claims that fail to offer sufficient specificity and
support at the pleading stage. But some have questioned whether this purported threat
is more perceived than real. Indeed, this doctrinal shift has been defended in several
ways that each suggest-in their own way-that the critical response to Twombly and
Iqbal may be much ado about little or nothing.
These apologies for the doctrinal shift, if you will, generally fall into three categories.
The first consists of arguments suggesting that the standard has not really changed
at all, which I will refer to as the "consistency" defense. The second group concedes
that there has been a change but argues that the change has not had or will not have a
substantial impact; I will call this the "inconsequentiality" defense. The final category
contains those arguments asserting that the changes are consequential but in a good
way, meaning that the strengthening of pleading standards was warranted and will be
beneficial to the litigation system. I refer to this type of argument as the "efficiency"
defense.
This essay responds to each of these apologies, finding that the consistency defense
is doctrinally unsound, that the inconsequentiality defense is doubtful (if not
counterfactual), and that the efficiency defense is misguided, given the patent
overinclusiveness and subjectivity of the plausibility doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he lawsuit is to vindicate rules of substantive law, not rules of
pleading, and the latter must always yield to the former.
-Charles Clark1

When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bel/Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcreftv. Iqbal,3 there was quite an uproar.4 Not only did the Court sidestep the
established rule amendment process to produce a novel rule ofpleading5 (overturn
ing Conley v. Gibson6 in the process), but the rule it announced was particularly
pernicious for its overinclusiveness,7 subjectivity,8 and disruptiveness. 9 Although
many commentators have remarked on and studied the effects of these two cases
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.
7.
8.

9.

CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 60 (2d ed. 1947).
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
See, e.g., Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contemptfar Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental
Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 571 (2012) ("Ashcrqft v. Iqbal is an embarrassment to the American
Judicial System in which a majority ofthe Supreme Court chose to reject the rule oflaw." (footnote
omitted)); see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal· A Double Play on the Federal
Rules cfCivil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 15 & n.52, 16 (2010) (citing examples of those observers
who "believe these two cases represent a major departure from the Court's established pleading
jurisprudence").
See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 453-54 (2008) (criticizing the
Court for circumventing the formal rule amendment process, which it has previously suggested was
the more appropriate means of redressing concerns with the general pleading standard set forth in
Rule 8(a)(2)); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) ('To the extent that the
court was concerned with this procedural issue, our cases demonstrate that questions regarding
pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either
by the rulemaking process or the legislative process.").
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009) (''It
seems, then, that plausibility pleading is overinclusive in that it potentially keeps valid claims from
entering the system.").
See id at 9 1-1 (describing how the Twombly doctrine's use of imprecise "[c]oncepts such as 'more
than labels and conclusions,' 'above the speculative level,' 'plausible grounds to infer,' 'enough factual
matter to suggest,' 'reasonable expectation,' and 'enough heft'" render the doctrine "too subjective to
yield predictable and consistent results across cases").
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) ('The headline need no longer equivocate after two recent U.S.
Supreme Court cases: Pleading Left Bleeding. The Court has revolutionized the law on pleading.
Litigators (and procedure scholars) have taken note of the Court's fresh pair of decisions, the
suggestive BellAtlantic Corp. v. Twombly and the definitive Ashcrqft v. Iqbal But these decisions do
more than redefine pleading rules. By inventing a new and foggy test for the threshold stage of
every lawsuit, they have destabilized the entire system ofcivil litigation." (footnotes omitted)).
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from critical perspectives, others have responded from less critical or even sup
portive perspectives. These pro- Twombly/Iqbal views generally fall into one of
three categories.
The first group of supporters maintains that the Twombly and Iqbal deci
sions did not fundamentally change pleading doctrine but rather were consistent
with the doctrine as traditionally understood or intended. 10 Thus, in their view,
Twombly and Iqbal properly articulated the level of specificity that Rule 8(a) has
always required (or intended) of claimants and the two cases (or at least
Twombly)11 were rightly decided. 12 I will refer to this perspective as the consistency
defense.
A second set of responses has focused less on the nature of any doctrinal
change and more on the impact of these two cases, concluding that the impact is
negligible if not nonexistent. This perspective has been buttressed by research on
motion to dismiss outcomes pre- and post- Twombly and Iqbal tending to show
little-to-no increase in grant rates in the aggregate.13 I will label this position the
inconsequentiality defense.
Finally, there are those who acknowledge that the Supreme Court's deci
sions have changed pleading doctrine but argue that the change is for the better.
Under this view, the Supreme Court was right to identify discovery expense and

10.

11.

12.
13.

if

See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation Court Access, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 873, 877 (2009) ("[T]he Supreme Court's decision in Twombly does not alter pleading rules
in as drastic a way as many of its critics, and even some of its few defenders, suppose."); id. at 890
("[I]t is wrong to condemn Twombljs plausibility standard for being inconsistent with the language
of Rule 8(a)(2) or the intent of the 1938 Advisory Committee.").
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised.· A Comment on Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 851 (2010) ("A clear understanding of the differences
between Iqbal and Twombly makes it possible to consider Twombljs virtues without the taint of
Iqba!s vices."); Luke Meier, Why Twombly Is Good Law (but Poorly Drafted) and Iqbal Will Be
Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. 709 (2012) (defending Twombly while criticizing Iqbal). Justice Souter can
certainly be described as someone who would defend Twombly but criticize Iqbal, since this is
precisely what he did by authoring the Twombly opinion but then filing a dissent in Iqbal. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 695-99 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing his disagreement
with the Iqbal majority but affirming his commitment to Twombly).
See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1299 (2010)
("[P]roperly understood, the post-Iqbal pleading framework is not fundamentally in conflict with
notice pleading . . . .").
See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES vii (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FJC STUDY], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Publications/motioniqbal.pdf ('There
was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated
the case." (citation omitted)).
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abuse as real problems ansmg from loose pleading standards; without the
screening that plausibility pleading provides, plaintiffs with unsubstantiated claims
will be able to access costly discovery, which could potentially extort undeserved
settlements from defendants. 14 Further, this group sees Twombly and Iqbal as
increasing efficiency in the system, by permitting the elimination of invalid claims
at the outset before judicial resources and litigant time and expense are taxed. 15 I
will refer to this last position as the efficiency defense. 16
This essay addresses these Twombly and Iqbal (or "Twiqba!') apologies,
concluding that each has its flaws. The adherents to the consistency defense
simply misunderstand (or misstate) the status quo ante. No plausible (pun
intended) view of our past under Rule 8(a) as originally written and intended, or as
subsequently interpreted and applied, could conclude that Twombly and Iqbal
were in sync with the Rule 8(a) we all came to know and love (or loathe) . The
inconsequentiality perspective is undercut by the unsoundness of the evaluative
methods on which it is based, focusing on facile pre- and post-Twiqbal grant rate
comparisons without taking into account the larger picture involving litigant
behavioral change and how revision of the pleading standard affects the assertion
of claims and the incidence of dismissal challenges. Finally, the efficiency view is
misguided because (1) it is based on the positing of a problem-discovery abuse
that has not been confirmed to exist, and (2) the remedy that Twombly and Iqbal
have delivered to address the ailments that efficiency proponents lament is poorly
calibrated for the task, being grossly subjective and overinclusive in ways that
ensnare meritorious claims in their grasp. Each of these responses to Twiqbal
apologists will be fleshed out more below.

I.

Tl-IE CONSISTENCY DEFENSE

The consistency defense of Twombly and Iqbal has three variants. The first
holds that Twombly and Iqbal track how lower courts were already interpreting

14.

15.
16.

The Court itself expressed this perspective when it wrote, "[t]he requirement of allegations sug
gesting an agreement serves the practical purpose of preventing a plaintiff with 'a largely groundless
claim' from 'tak[ing] up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value."' Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546
(2007) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Adam Steinman helpfully cites to some of the staunch defenders of Iqbal from this perspective in a
recent article on post-Iqbal pleading doctrine. See Steinman, supra note 12, at 1297 n.13.
Other groups responding to Twombly and Iqbal in a sympathetic way could include those who feel
it is too soon to evaluate the cases or those who believe that one or both of the cases reached the
right result but unnecessarily butchered the doctrine in the process.
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and applying Rule 8(a) and thus are consistent with the reality of pleading on
the ground. 17 This variant is the easiest to address because it is largely beside the
point. The issue is whether the Supreme Court revised pleading doctrine in
Twombly and Iqbal. The mere fact that some lower courts had already moved
in such a direction does not speak to where the Supreme Court stood on the mat
ter. Certainly, if there were circuits that could fairly be described as imposing a
plausibility pleading standard prior to Twombly, then life in those circuits may not
have changed radically. But again, the question is whether plausibility pleading is
a revision to the Supreme Court's understanding of the requisites of Rule 8(a)(2) ;
no amount of circuit court prescience in moving to such an approach beforehand
can supplant the need to address that question directly. To the extent that
Twiqbal defenders hold that the previous embrace of heightened pleading by
lower courts will mitigate the impact of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, that
point will be addressed in Part II below.
The second version of the consistency defense argues that nothing has
changed beyond the language we use to describe the pleading standard. 18 The
Court itself included rhetoric suggestive of this position in the Twombly and Iqbal
opinions when it wrote, "[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. "19 However, elsewhere in its opinion the Court confirmed that a meaningful
change of some kind had come. For starters, it "retired" the "no set of facts"
standard of Conley v. Gibson, which had previously held that "a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

17.

18.

19.

See, e.g., Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" ShowingAfte, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV.
L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (suggesting the Twombljs plausibility showing is consistent with the standard
already used in more than half the circuits, that "a complaint . . . contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory" (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed
sub n om. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 462 U.S. 1125 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Tamin g Twombly, EvenAfte, Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 48485 (2010) ("Courts have long held that legal conclusions need not be accepted as true on 12(b)(6)
motions, have long insisted that pleaders are not entitled to unreasonable factual inferences, and
have long treated 'legal conclusions,' 'unwarranted deductions,' 'unwarranted inferences,'
'unsupported conclusions,' and 'sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations' as
'more or less synonymous' terms. So understood, Twombljs insistence that the inference of
conspiracy be 'plausible' is equivalent to the traditional insistence that an inference be 'reasonable."'
(footnote omitted)).
Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570.
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to relief "20 That was no small thing, given how that standard was ensconced in
pleading doctrine.21 Were it the case that the Court was not revising the doctrine
in a significant way, there would be no need to abrogate the Conley approach and
supplant it with plausibility. Next, the standard the Court announced
plausibility-had never before been articulated in the Rule 8(a) context; the
requirement of a statement showing "plausible" entitlement to relief is undeniably
an innovation as much as it was when the concept was inserted into the summary
judgment analysis.22 But perhaps most telling is the Court's articulation of its
motivation for the plausibility interpretation-the forestalling of discovery abuse
that the Conley approach would (in its view) continue to facilitate.23 Clearly, if
Twombly simply reflected a change in terminology, the Court would not have
needed to refer to these concerns in support of its imposition of the plausibility
requirement. The lower courts are certainly acknowledging a change;24 why not
the Court? One can only speculate, but conceding a wholesale revision of the
meaning of Rule 8(a) and what it requires would run embarrassingly counter to
the Court's own prior unequivocal admonition that such judicial amendment of a
rule would be an improper circumvention of the Rules Enabling Act process.25
The third variation of the consistency defense argues that although the
Court was changing the prevailing understanding of the general pleading stan-

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

25.

Id at 561 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
See Spencer, supra note 5, at 436-39 (describing the Court's unwavering support for the Conley
decision over a fifty-year period).
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596 (1986) ("[T]he absence
of any plausible motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to whether a 'genuine
issue for trial' exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e).").
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 ("[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants
to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably, then, it is only by
taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to
avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no 'reasonably founded hope
that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to support a § 1 claim." (second
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g., Giarratano v.Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he Twombly standard is
even more favorable to dismissal of a complaint."); Geller v. Von Hagens, No. 8: 10-CIV-1688EAK-AEP, 2010WL 4867540, at *2 (MD. Fla. Nov. 23, 2010) ("At the outset it should be noted
that Iqbal and Twombly significantly changed the pleading standard required previously.").
See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 16869 (1993) ("Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under§
1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(6). But that is a result
which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation. In the absence of such an amendment, federal courts and litigants must rely on
summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than
later."); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
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<lard that had developed over time, it was being true to the original meaning of
Rule 8(a), and the plausibility interpretation is wholly consistent with the
language and the spirit of Rule 8(a).26 Under this view, Rule 8(a) was written to
require a "showing" of "entitlement to relief'-saying nothing of notice-and
jurists around the time of its adoption and for years thereafter maintained that
specific rather than overly liberal pleading was required under the Rule.27 Two
assumptions seem built into this perspective. The first is that the status quo prior
to Twombly was a pure notice pleading regime in which one could get into court
on the barest of allegations;28 the second is that plausibility pleading requires only
the offering of a factual narrative that, if assumed true, would entitle the pleader
to relief.29 I n other words, this iteration of the consistency position requires that
pre-Twombly pleading doctrine be caricatured into a straw man not reflective of
what pleading doctrine really entailed and that post- Twombly pleading doctrine be
redefined into something less than it truly is-both counterfactual assumptions.
No one seriously believed prior to Twombly that one could get into court with a
bare allegation naming the parties and b aldly asserting harm. 3° Further,
Twombly-supplemented by Iqbal--can hardly be minimized to having wrought
only the need for a factual narrative showing entitlement to relief Such an

26.

See Bone, supra note 10, at 890 ("[I]t is wrong to condemn Twomb!ys plausibility standard for being
inconsistent with the language of Rule 8(a)(2) or the intent of the 1938 Advisory Committee.");
Douglas G. Smith, The Evolution a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 OR. L. REV.
1053, 1055 (2009) ("[I]t is a decision that is consistent with the text of Rule 8, giving effect to
language that in the past had often lain dormant.").
Bone, supra note 10, at 892 ("[Rule 8(a)(2)] does not refer to notice pleading explicitly. . . .
Moreover, not everyone agreed that the federal standard should be very liberal notice pleading. . . .
U]urists and politicians sharply divided on the pleading issue, some insisting that specific pleading
was essential to properly framing the lawsuit and rendering it manageable.").
This assumption was apparent in both of the Supreme Court's decisions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces . . . demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation."); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 ("On
such a focused and literal reading of Conlejs 'no set of facts,' a wholly conclusory statement of claim
would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff
might later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery." (alteration in original)).
Bone, supra note 10, at 893 ('What is clear is that the Committee intended to reject the code
version of fact pleading and Twomb!ys pleading standard is a far ciy from that. The Twombly
Court does not insist that every fact essential to liability be alleged clearly and precisely, nor does it
insist that the complaint contain only allegations of ultimate fact rather than legal conclusions or
evidence.").
See, e.g., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT
WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CI1Y 69 (Edward H.
Hammond ed., 1939) ("If you were to say, even under these rules, 'I am suing ''X'' because he
caused me injuiy by negligence,' I would say that that is more general than is permitted by these
rules." (remarks of Charles Clark)).

if

27.

28.

29.

30.
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understatement cannot be squared with the Court's insistence that plausibility
requires that liability be a more likely explanation than lawful altematives31 and
that conclusory allegations be disregarded without any clear explanation of how
one might so label allegations in a consistent and principled manner,32 notwith
standing the purported endurance of the assumption- of - truth principle. 33 Add in
the Court's direction that judges are now to use their 'J udicial experience and
common sense" to assess the plausibility of allegations in a complaint,34 and you
have the makings of a doctrine that not one of the drafters of Rule 8 would
recognize as their own creation.
Certainly, it is true that----as some argue--the concept of"notice pleading"
itself is not found in Rule 8(a) but rather was suggested in Conley v. Gibson, a
Supreme Court decision interpreting Rule 8: "[Rule 8(a)(2)] does not refer to
notice pleading explicitly. The term ' notice pleading' was in common use at the
time to refer to the most li beral pleading standard, so if notice pleading were
intended, one might have expected the text of the Rule or the Committee Note
to say so. "35 Thus, the argument goes, the Supreme Court was not only within its
rights to abandon the concept, but the concept itself has no claim to representing
the original intent of the Rule. 36 Although it is correct to say that Rule 8 does not
mention notice pleading, the term is merely shorthand for what the drafters
intended the Rule to accomplish in contradistinction to the functions of pleading
under prior regimes. There is no indication that Rule 8 was intended to serve as a
screening mechanism; original rules committee reporter Charles Clark expressly

31 .
32.
33.

34 .
35.
36 .

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 ("[W ]he n alleg ations of paralle l conduct are se t out in orde r to make a§
1 claim, the y must be place d in a contex t that raise s a sugge stion of a pre ce ding ag ree me nt, not
me re ly para lle l conduct that could just as we ll be indepe nde nt acti on.").
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 699 ( Soute r, J., disse nting ) ( "[T]he maj ority' s holdi ng that the state me nts it
se le cts are conclusory cannot be square d with its tre atme nt of ce rtain othe r alleg ations in the
complaint as nonconclusory.").
A. Benj amin Spe nce r, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L .
REV . 185, 192 ( 2010) (" Iqbal is a cle ar challe nge to the continuing vitality of the assumption-of 
truth ru le g ive n the Court' s poorly explaine d re je ction of what we re unde niably alleg ations that we re
non-conclusory and fa ctual in natu re .").
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ( "De te rmi ning whe the r a complaint states a plausible claim for relief wi ll . . .
be a conte xt-spe cific task that re qui re s the re viewing court to draw on its judicial expe rie nce and
common se nse. ").
Bone , supra note 10, at 892 ; id. at 893 ( "Rule 8(a) came to stand cle arl y fo r notice ple ading mai nly
throug h judicial inte rp re tations of the Rule .").
Id. at 893 ("If notice ple ading is be st unde rstood as a judicial inte rpre tation of Rule 8( a)(2 ), the n it is
hardly illeg iti mate for the Court to rev isit thi s e arlie r inte rpre tation and quali fy or re vi se it.").
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disclaimed such a purpose as inappropriate37 and indicated that other rules were
designed to fulfill that fu nction.38 Initiating the case and informing one's op
ponent of the nature of the purported controversy in a manner sufficient to form a
response-a notification function-is what the concept of notice pleading de
scribes.39 The more important point, however, is not whether notice pleading is
the proper label for what Rule 8 requires but rather whether the Court post
Twombly and Iqbal is requiring of a complaint more than what Rule 8 originally
required. The answer to that question is clearly yes. Distinguishing between
factual and legal allegations and assessing the plausibility of a set of allegations in
light of one's "j udicial experience and common sense" find their heritage-if

37 .

38 .

39 .

Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R D . 45, 46-- 47 ( 1957) (''I fear that eveiy
age must learn its lesson that spec ial pleading c annot be made to do the service of trial and that li ve
issues between ac tive liti gants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings, i.e., the
form alistic claims of the parties. Exp erience has found no quick and easy short cu t for trials in cases
generally and antitr ust cases in particular. Much time and expense, waste motion and injustice have
gone into the attempt, but experience is wholly clear that such quicki e justice always break s down . .

. .").

Charl es E . Clark , Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R D . 456, 467 ( 1943) ("If a claim or defense is legally
stated, then the matter of particularizati on should be foregone. The parties are pro tected by dis
c oveiy, pre-trial, and summary judgment.") . The Supreme Court itself has shared thi s view:
O ther provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proc edure are inextr ic ably
li nked to Rule 8( a)' s simplified notice pleading standard. Rule 8( e)(l ) states that
" [ n] o tec hnic al forms of pleading or moti ons are requi red, " and Rule 8(£) provides
that " [ a] ll pleadings shal l be so c onstrued as to do substantial justic e." Given the
Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, "[ a] c ourt may dismiss a c omplaint
only i f it is c lear that no reli ef c ould be granted under any set of fac ts that could be
proved c onsistent with the allegations." If a pleading fails to spec ify the allegations
in a manner that provides suffic ient notic e, a defendant c an move for a more defini te
statement under Rule 12( e) before responding. Moreover, c lai ms lack ing merit may
be dealt with th rough summary judgm ent under Rule 56.
Swierki ewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 ( 20 0 2) ( alterations in original) ( citation
om itted) .
Clark described "the notice fu nction of pleading[]" as follows:
[Notice] cannot be defined so literally as to mean all the detai ls of the parties'
claims, or else the rule is no advance. The notice in m ind is rather that of the
general nature of the case and the circumstances or events upon which it is based, so
as to differentiate it from other acts or events, to inform the opponent of the affair or
transaction to be li tigated- but not of detai ls which he should ascertain for himself
in preparing his defense-an d to tell the court of the broad outlines of the case.
Thus it serves the purposes referred to above of routing the case through proper
court channels for the c hoice of juiy or other form of trial and the like, and,
ultimately, for the applic ation of res judic ata to the final judgment rendered.
Clark , supra note 38, at 460-6 1.

60 UCLA L. REV. 1710 (2013)
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anywhere-in pleading under the codes,40 not in Rule 8's language or intended
meamng.
Even if the original drafters were open to the concept of heightened plead
ing as a means of merits screening, they clearly did not infuse Rule 8(a) with that
purpose; Rule 9(6) was the vehicle through which they imposed particularized
pleading.41 Thus, as the Court itself has acknowledged, by singling out fraud and
mistake allegations for particularized pleading, the drafters clearly indicated that
such pleading was not expected elsewhere.42 To now claim that generalizing
heightened pleading across all claim types is consistent with Rule 8(a)(2) thus
makes little sense. In short, although the drafters, if resurrected, might consent to
a reform such as the one that Twombly and Iqbal have imposed as a proper and
pragmatic response to the realities of modern litigation, that in no way means they
would endorse the notion that the words they placed within Rule 8(a) meant such
things all along. Procedural rules "should be continually changed and improved,"43
but through the established process for amending the Rules formally.44

II.

TuEINCONSEQUENTIALITYDEFENSE

A second theme among apologists is that the effects of the revis10n to
pleading standards ushered in by Twombly and Iqbal have been negligible, meaning
that concern over the change is much ado about little or nothing. Here again we
confront multiple variants of this defense.
40.

41.
42.

43.
44.

Code pleading refers to the procedural regime in state courts beginning in the mid-nineteenth
centwy and was the successor to common law pleading. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 21- 31. Code
pleading was exemplifi.ed by the Field Code, N.Y. CODE PROC. (1848). See Stephen N. Subrin,
David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis ofan Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW &
HIST. REV. 311 (1988).
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(6) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circum
stances constituting fraud or mistake.").
On this point, the Court wrote as follows:
"[T]he Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(6) the question of the need for greater
particularity in pleading certain actions, but do not include among the enumerated
actions any reference to complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Just as Rule 9(6) makes no mention of municipal
liability . . . neither does it refer to employment discrimination. Thus, complaints in
these cases, as in most others, must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a).
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of]ustice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q297, 304 (1938).
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 ('Whatever the practical merits of this argument, the Federal
Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits. A
requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that 'must be obtained by the
process ofamending the Federal Rules, and not byjudicial interpretation."' (citation omitted)).
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lnconsequentiality Version 1: Aligning Doctrinal Change With
Preexisting Lower Court Heightened PleadingApproaches Means
That Impact Wil l Be M in imal

The first version is the claim that Twombly and Iqbal are in line with what
lower courts were doing already,45 m aking change at the Supreme Court level
inconsequential for most l itigants. As an initial matter, there are legitimacy
concerns about how the Court made this change that are overlooked by this
version of the inconsequentiality defense. Although it is certainly true that lower
courts had continually imposed heightened pleading for some time in certain
types of cases,46 the Supreme Court had rebuffed these efforts and indicated their
impropriety with a unanimous voice.47 For the Court now to acquiesce to lower
court disobedience in this area simply rewards their insubordination. Seeing
what happened in Twombly, lower courts may be encouraged to persist in delin
quent interpretations with the hope that the Court wil l one day follow their lead
as it did in that case. More importantly, if trying to rewrite Rule 8(a) was law
lessness when done by the lower courts----as the Supreme Court said it was--then
it is no more legitimate at the hands of the Court itself, notwithstanding its au
thority over the rule promulgation process.48 The rulemaking process exists for a
reason, and the Court should adhere to it in order to give notice of an impending

45.

46 .

47 .

48 .

Bri an T. Fi tzpatri ck, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 8 7 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 1622
(2012) ("Twombly and Iqbal may not be nearl y as revoluti onary as firs t meets the eye; as a practical
matter, lower federal courts long ag o elevated pleading standards in the face of the ex ponential
increases in di scovery costs fa ced by corporate defendants.").
See Christopher M. Fai rman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L . REV. 98 7, 988 (20 0 3)
("Notwithstandi ng its fo undation in the Federal Rules and repeated Supreme Court imprimatu r,
notice pleading i s a myth. Fro m antitrust to envi ronmental li tigation, conspiracy to copy rig ht,
substance speci fi c areas of law are ri ddled with requirements of particulariz ed fa ct-based pleadi ng .
T o be sure, federal courts recite the mantra of notice pleading with amazi ng regulari ty . However,
their rhetoric does not match the reality of federal pleading practice." (footnote omitted)).
See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (holding, by a unanimous opinion, that " imposing the Court of
Appeals' heig htened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases confli cts with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a)(2)"); L eatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intellig ence &
Coordination Unit, 50 7 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) ('We think that it is impossible to square the
'heig htened pleading standard' applied by the Fift h Circuit in this case with the liberal sy stem of
'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules.").
Professor Fi tzp atri ck makes thi s point, suggesti ng that the Court' s authori ty to approve or rej ect
amendments to the Rules means that the Court was not usurp ing authority in any meaningfu l way.
Fitzpatr ick, supra note 45, at 1636 n.92 (" [N]othing prevents the political branches fr om overru ling
Twombly and Iqbal now; thus, to the ex tent Twombly and Iqbal usurp ed some power of the political
branches, it was a relatively minor one: the power to overru le a chang e before (rather than merely
aft er) the chang e takes effect.").
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change, enable commenters and empirics to influence the change, and permit
experts to weigh in on how the proposed change might affect the system as a
whole, all points that Professors Stephen Y eazell and Kevin Clermont have made
previously.49 Plus, the amendment route is more honest, because it confesses that
a change is taking place, something the Court has yet to acknowledge respecting
its Twiqbal jurisprudence.
Further, endorsing plausibility pleading at the Supreme Court level has
been disruptive to the Federal Rules system because Rule 8(a) and its previous
interpretation were part of a carefully calibrated system of rules designed to
address the concerns that lower courts and now the Supreme Court have smug
gled into the pleading phase. Rule 8(e) calls for construing pleadings to do
justice,50 Rule 9(6) calls for the "general[]" pleading of allegations of malice, intent,
knowledge, and conditions of the mind,5 1 Rule 1 1(6)(3) contemplates and
permits allegations that lack factual support to be made if so labeled and if
discovery is likely to fill in the gaps,52 Rule 12(e) permits a motion for a more
definite statement when the statement of the claim is insufficiently precise to
provide the requisite notice that would permit the defendant to form a response,53
and Rule 84 approves of a set of forms that indicate factual specificity is not
required to support legal allegations such as a "negligent" collision.54 I ndeed,
then-Justice Rehnquist cited the existence of notice pleading as buttressing and
necessitating his reinterpretation of the Rule 56 summary judgm ent standard in
Celotex.55 Twombly and Iqbal destabilized this system by creating a dissonance

49 .

50.
51 .
5 2.
5 3.
5 4.
55.

Cle rmont & Ye azel l, supra note 9, at 850 ( "[B]efo re discarding the ple ading sys te m that has bee n in
place for many ye ars, we oug ht to discuss its virtue s and fail ure s sobe rly and with the re levant
information be fore us. The ru le making bodie s shoul d have hoste d that discussion. Twombly
and Iqbal short-circuite d any such discussion. The se case s worke d the ir re form by a proce ss
adjudication- that is hardly the preferre d path to de sign change .") .
FED . R. CIV . P. 8(e) . Formerl y, the ru le re qu ire d that courts do "substantial" justice ; this word was
eliminate d during the 2007 re styl ing of the Rule s. FED . R. CIV . P. 8(e) ( 2006) ( repe ale d 2007) .
FED . R. Crv . P. 9( 6) .
FED . R. Crv . P. 11( 6)(3) .
FED . R. CIV . P. 12(e) .
FED . R. CIV . P. 84; FED . R. Crv . P.Form 11.
Ce lotex Corp. v. Catre tt, 477 U.S. 317 ( 1986) .
Befo re the shift to "notice ple ading" accomplishe d by the Fe de ral Ru le s, motions to
dismiss a complaint or to str ike a defe nse we re the principal tools by which factu ally
insuffi cie nt claims or defe nse s cou ld be isolate d and preve nte d from g oing to trial with
the atte ndant unwarrante d consumption of public and private re source s. But with the
adve nt of "notice ple ading, " the motion to dismiss se ldom fu1fills this fu nction any more,
and itsplace has bee n taken by the motion for summary judg me nt.
Id. at 327.
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between Rule 8(a)'s new meaning and other rules continuing to support a liberal
pleading regime. This tension will have to be resolved through litigation or
through efforts by the rulemakers to amend the Rules to eliminate the dissonance.56
More to the point, however, this iteration of the inconsequentiality defense
is flawed because although lower courts may have been imposing heightened
pleading in certain cases, they were not doing it in all cases and they were not
doing it the way that Twombly and Iqbal now require. Heightened pleading was
restricted to certain "disfavored" actions, including civil rights, employment
discrimination, antitrust, and RICO claims.57 As Iqbal made clear, Twombly's
plausibility standard applies to all cases.58 I ndeed, there are lower courts that are
applying the Twiqbal standard to the pleading of affirmative defenses.59 Further,
no lower court had gone beyond requiring fact pleading60 toward the monstrosity
that is plausibility pleading. Under Twombly and Iqbal, judges are to use their
experience and their common sense to determine whether a claim is "plausible,"
after setting aside allegations deemed conclusory according to some undefined

56 .

57 .

58 .
59 .

60.

For example, at i ts No vember 2012 meeti ng, theA dvi sor y Co mmi ttee o n Civi l Rules had "Rule 8 4:
Pro po sal to A brogate" o n i ts agenda, ci ting the tensio n between the offici al forms and the Twombly
and Iqbal deci sio ns. ADVISORY COMM . ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA BOOK 7, 40 7 (20 12) ,
available at http://ww w.usco ur ts.go v/ usco ur ts/RulesA ndPoli ci es/r ules/A genda% 20Book s/ Civi l/
CV20 12-10 .pd£
Chri sto pher M. F air man helpfu lly r eviewed thi s pheno meno n in Heightened Pleading, 8 1 TEx . L.
REV . 551 (20 0 2). E arly in that pi ece, foo tno te 6 li sts a few examples of ty pes of actions that have
been held to requi re heightened pleading standards: Gold v. Morrison- Knudsen Co., 68 F. 3d 1475,
1476 (2d Cir. 1995) (qui tam) ; Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F. 2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 198 4)
(antitru st) ; Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 8 92, 90 0 (D . Mass. 1991) (CERCLA) ; North
jersey Secretarial School, Inc. v. McKiernan, 713 F. Supp. 577, 58 4 (S.D .N.Y. 198 9) (co nspiracy) ;
Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 58 2 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D . Colo . 198 4) (RICO) ; Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F.
Supp. 621, 622 (N.D . Io wa 1963) (defamatio n) . Id. at 551 n.6.
A shcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 68 4 (20 09) ("O ur decisio n in Twombly expo unded the pleading
standard for ' all civil actio ns' . .. . ") .
See, e.g., Smithvi ll e 169 v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., No . 4: 11-CV-08 72-DGK, 2012 WL
13677, at *1 (W.D . Mo . Jan. 4, 2012) ('T his Co urt, like a majo rity of district co urts, has held that
the Iqbal standard applies to affirm ative defenses.") ; Burn s v. Do dek a, LLC, No . 4: 0 9-CV-19-BJ,
20 10 WL 190 398 7, at *1 (ND. Tex. May 11, 20 10) (" [T]he Co urt co ncludes the defendant' s
affirm ative defenses o f proxi mate cause and fa ilure to mitigate are who ll y co ncluso ry and fai l to
plead any facts that demo nstrate the plausibility o f such defenses as required byBellAtlantic Corp. v.
Twombly and its pro geny." (citatio n o mitted)) .
See, e.g., McKiernan, 713 F. Supp. at 58 4 ("[T] he co mplai nt fail s to allege fa cts whi ch sho w i njur y to
co mpetitio n, as distinct fro m inj ury to a co mpetito r. No vio latio n o f Sectio n 1 o f the Sherman Act
is po ssible absent proof of anti-co mpetitive effect beyo nd the injury to plaintifls, and facts must be
pl eaded fro m whi ch such effect can be i nferred." (quo ting Jarmatt Tr ucki ng Leasing Cor p. v.
Brooklyn Pie Co ., 525 F. Supp. 749, 750 (E .D .N.Y . 198 1)) .
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standard.61 This level of subjectivity was foreign to the pre- Twombly heightened
pleading approaches and will yield a level of unpredictability that assures incon
sistent results while encouraging increased motion practice as more defendants
attempt to obtain a dismissal under these ill-defined standards.62 Such a result
was borne out by the Federal Judicial Center's (FJC's) recent motion to dismiss
study, which found a general increase since Twombly and Iqbal in the incidence of
filing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.63
A district court case decided after Iqbal illustrates this point. Branham v.
Dolgencorp, Inc.64 was a slip-and-fall case removed from Virginia state court to the
U.S. District Court for the Western D istrict of Virginia. The plaintiff alleged in
her complaint that she "fell due to the negligence of the Defendants . . . who
negligently failed to remove the liquid from the floor and had negligently failed to
place warning signs to alert and warn the Plaintiff of the wet floor. "65 The de
fendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and the court
granted the motion.66 In doing so, the court wrote:
In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show
how the liquid came to be on the floor, whether the Defendant knew or
should have known of the presence of the liquid, or how the Plaintiffs
accident occurred. Without such allegations, the Plaintiff cannot show
that she has a "right to relief above the speculative level." While
consistent with the possibility of the Defendant's liability, the Plaintiffs
conclusory allegations that the Defendant was negligent because there
was liquid on the flood [sic], but that the Defendant failed to remove
the liquid or warn her ofits presence are insufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief.67
Two things are clear. First, prior to Twombly, not one single court would
have treated this plaintiffs complaint as insufficient under the Conley inter-

61 .
6 2.

6 3.
64 .
65 .
66.
67 .

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("De te rmining whe the r a complaint state s a plausib le claim for re lie f wi ll . . .
be a conte xt-spe cific task that require s the re viewing court to draw on its judicial expe rie nce and
common se nse .").
This point has bee n sugge ste d b y Profe ssors Ye azell and Cle rmont: ''In me re ly de scrib ing the
Supre me Court's new te st, we all b ut e stab lishe d that its me aning is veiy uncle ar. At a minimum, the
fo ggine sswarn s that any de fe ndant's lawye r . . . commits le gal malpractice i f he or she fails to move to
dismiss with lib eral citations to Twombly and Iqbal " Cle rmont & Ye aze ll, supra note 9, at 840.
2011 FJC STIJDY , supra note 13, at vii ("There was a ge ner al incre ase from 20 0 6 to 2010 in the r ate
of fil ing of motions to dismiss for fa ilure to state a claim .. . . ").
No. 6: 0 9-CV-0 0 0 37, 20 0 9WL 260444 7 (W .D . Va. Aug. 24, 20 09).
The e ntire ty of the plaintiff s complaint is reproduce d in the Appe ndi x.
Branh am, 20 09 WL 26044 47, at *3.
Id at *2 ( citations omitte d).

A Response to Twiqbal Apologists

1725

pretation of Rule 8(a). Second, even courts that had embraced heightened
pleading previously would not have considered applying such a standard to a basic
slip-and-fall negligence case. To the extent more stringent pleading now perme
ates across all case types, such is a change that will shift the pleading landscape
among the lower courts beyond where they stood before Twombly.
B.

lnconsequentiality Version 2: Studies Show That There Has Been No
Practical Adverse Impact

The second version of the inconsequentiality argument is based on a set of
empirical studies purporting to demonstrate how little Twombly and Iqbal have
impacted litigation outcomes. The most prominent study along these lines was
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, which demonstrated that overall
motion to dismiss grant rates had not risen significantly in the period following
the decisions,68 leading the researchers to conclude that Twombly and Iqbal were
not having the impact on outcomes supposed by many.69 This conclusion was
reached notwithstanding the researchers' findings that the rate at which motions
to dismiss were being filed had increased.70 There are several problems with this
conclusion. 71

68.
69.

70.

71.

See 2011 FJC STUDY, supra note 13, at vii ('There was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at
which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated the case . . . .").
See id at 16 ("[I]f the district courts were inteipreting Twombly and Iqbal to significantly foreclose
the opportunity for further litigation in the case, we would expect to see an increase in cases
terminated soon after the order. However, . . . we found no statistically significant increase in 2010
in the percentage of cases terminated in 30 days, 60 days, or 90 days after the order granting the
motion. Nor did we find differences in termination rates across individual types of cases.").
See id at 21 ('The data show a general increase in the rate at which motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim were filed in the first 90 days of the case."). For a useful analysis of the FJC's data, see
Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, L ockin g the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects effwombly and Iqbal
on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2326-27 (2012), stating, "Among total other cases, the
filing rate increased from 3.1% to 5.00/4. For employment discrimination and civil rights cases, the
12(6)(6) MTD filing rate increased from 6.90/4 to 9.0 percent, and from 10.8% to 12.1%,
respectively."
One problem that I do not address here has been extensively treated by Professor Lonny Hoffinan,
who criticized the FJC study from a technical/statistical perspective. See Lonny Hoffinan,
Twombly and Iqbals M easure: A n Assessment of the Federal judicial Centers Study of M otions to
Dismiss, 6 FED. COURTS L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) ('The problem with this inteipretation of the study's
findings is that it is greatly, if unintentionally, misleading. By summarily announcing that the
observed increases were not statistically significant, but not explaining what that technical
terminology means (and, as importantly, what it does not mean), the study confuses readers into
thinking that it demonstrated the Court's decisions had no impact on dismissal practice.").
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It is worth pointing out that to the extent that an increase in the incidence of
motions to dismiss is the product of the raising of pleading standards, more
plaintiffs are having to respond to such motions than before, with a larger raw
number of plaintiffs not surviving the motion to dismiss stage. Thus, one po
tential consequence worth taking into account is the impact of Twombly and Iqbal
on motion to dismiss filing rates, not just grant rates. Were it the case that an
increase in motion to dismiss filing rates could be connected with the new
pleading standard, that itself would be a sufficient cause for concern, as an
increase in motions raises costs (expense and delay) for those plaintiffs and
expands the number of plaintiffs who fail to gain access to discovery and to a reso
lution on the merits.72
More importantly, grant rate comparisons are inadequate because that mea
sure neglects the impact that the doctrinal change has had on party behavior,
which can have a major impact on aggregate motion to dismiss outcomes that
may not be apparent in grant rates alone. Jonah Gelbach has done some of the
most useful analysis on this point. As Gelbach notes, changes to legal rules not only
can implicate judicial behavior but can affect party behavior,73 meaning that an
increase in the cost of litigation can deter some plaintiffs from bringing their cases
because of the impact that change has on the expected net benefit associated with
their claims.74 Similarly, changes to the pleading standard will result in more
defendants choosing to file motions to dismiss (rather than answering or settling)
because the expected benefit from doing so has increased. 75 So when we look at
7 2.

7 3.

7 4.

75.

Were we able to have confidence that these disaffected plaintiffs had meritless claims, then this
result would not be lamentable. H owev er , as wi ll be disc ussed below in Par t III, the plausibili ty
standar d does not screen out meritless claims or even doubtfu l c laims but simpl y claims that have
unanswer ed questions.
Gelbach, supra note 70, at 23 05 (" Simple comparisons of adjud icativ e results, like how oft en
plaintiffs win at tri al, tend to mix together (i) the effec ts ofc hanges in legal rules on cases that would
be li tigated regard less of the choice of legal ru les and ( ii) changes in case composition that result
fr om the change in legal rules. Party selection thus lurk s beneath the empirical surfa ce, laying a
trap for researchers who try to measure the effects of changes in legal rules using before-and
after comparisons ofv ariables that seem to measure outcomes of interest." (footnote omitted) ).
Id at 23 06-- 07 (" Such plaintiff selection oc=s in cases where a switch to heightened pleading
increases a plaintiff s perceiv ed probability that a motion to dismiss would be granted against her
complaint. The pl aintiff s net exp ected gains from litigating will fa ll if she thinks the defendant
might fi le an MID . Some plaintiffs will choose not to file their cases in the first place as a result of
this reduction in net expected gains from litigating.") .
A s Gelbach wr ites:
Suppose that a change in procedural rules increases each party' s perceiv ed proba
bili ty that a motion to dismiss would be gra nted---a s many observers, and v irtually
all cr itic s, thi nk Twombly and Iqbal do. D efendants will beli eve their returns to
fil ing MTD s hav e r isen. A s a result, under Twombly/Iqbal they will file MTD s
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the grant rates under current pleading standards compared with prior to
Twombly, current rates could be the product of changed judicial behavior, party
selection, or both.76 As a result, "the simple possibility that party selection exists
renders comparisons of [ motion to dismiss] grant rates across pleading regimes
an unreliable measure of judicial behavior effects. "77 The existing empirical lit
erature does not and cannot measure the impact that plausibility pleading has on
plaintiffs' (and their lawyers') decisions to file a lawsuit in the first place or
defendants' decisions to file a motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, Gelbach has attempted to calculate the lower bound on the
share of claims that have b een negatively impacted by Twombly and Iqbal. To do
this, Gelbach constructs a correction factor that takes into account selection
effects, reaching the conclusion that at least 18. 1 percent of civil rights cases, 15.4
percent of employment discrimination cases, and 21 .5 percent of all other cases
were negatively affected by Twombly and Iqbal, meaning at least those
percentages of claimants would not have had motions to dismiss granted against
them had the pleading regime not changed. 78 As a mere lawyer, I am not
qualified to assess the strength of Gelbach's statistical analysis. What is clear,
however, is that we need better studies designed to capture that which we can
know regarding the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on judicial and party behavior.
Looking at motion to dismiss grant rates alone certainly cannot give us an

76.

77 .
78 .

ag ainst some complai nts that they would answer under Con/,ry------ there wi ll be some
defendant selection.
Id. at 2306 .
Gelbach explains th is as follows: Were we able t o say that a motion to dism iss g ranted post
Twiqbal may have been denied under Conley, that would reveal the judi ci al behavi or effects of the
two cases. Id. at 2301. However, changes in party behavi or must be taken into account as well ,
meaning that some defendants wi ll fil e motions to di smiss post-Twiqbal that they would not have
filed previ ously; when this happens, a certai n proportion of those addi tional motions wi ll be
g ranted, adding to the total dism issals faced by plaintiffs. Id. at 2311-13. If the motions th at
would not ha ve been fi led under Conley but are now fi led have a lower success rate, the overall g rant
rate would actually go down. Id. at 2313. For example if 5 out of 10 motions were g ranted before
Twombly, but after Twombly 3 additional motions are fil ed that would not have beenwith a 1 out of
3 success rate, the pre-Twombly g rant rate would be 50 percent and the post Twombly rate would be
6 out of 13, 46 percent. See id. at 2312- 14 (using different numbers to illustrate the point) . Thus,
as Gelbach notes, 'Without more information about party behavior, neither the direction nor the
magnitude of the d ifference inMTD g rant rates across pleading reg imes tells us anyth ing about the
mag nitude of any judicial behavior effects. O n its face, then, the exi sting empirical literature on
Twombly/Iqbal cannot tell us much about judicial behavior effects." Id. at 2314.
Id. at 2311; see also id. at 2329 ("[l] n the presence of defendant selection, even such a nul l findi ng
need not contrad ict the hyp othesis that Twombly and Iqbal have harmed plaintiffs or reduced
di scovery access.").
Id. at 2331.
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accurate picture, although there are emerging studies that show that if one
analyz es grant rates properly, a post- Twiqbal increase can indeed be detected,
contrary to the findings of the FJC. 79 Surveys of district judges might provide
some insight into at least whether judges believe they are evaluating pleadings
differently under those two cases than under Conley. Attorney surveys might
similarly reveal whether Twombly and Iqbal have impacted case intake decisions
and motion to dismiss filing decisions.
More broadly, we also need to recognize the limits of empirics. G iven what
we cannot know-the actual judicial behavior and party selection effects under
the two competing regimes80 -our evaluation of the merits and of the impact
of the doctrinal revision cannot be based solely on such methods. The impact on
litigation cost, outcomes, and decisionmaking must be considered alongside nor
mative concerns, including the propriety of judicial revision of the standard, the
efficacy of the new standard in relation to its stated objectives, and the policy
implications behind a plausibility-based screening mechanism vis-a-vis our ul
timate objectives for the procedural system. This wider array of consequences
will be discussed in Part III below.
Ill.

THE EFFICIENCYDEFENSE

The last in this review of the Twiqbal apologia are those defenders that not
only recognize the change-they laud it. The suggestion here is that the reality
and the threat of discovery abuse, or at least its enormous expense, empower
tenuous or meritless claims to yield extortionate settlements. 81 Thus, from this
perspective, a corrective was in order to prevent such claims from accessing
79.
80.

81 .

Profe ssor A lex Re inert i s in the proce ss of comple ting such a study, which wil l soon be pub lished .
A lex ande r A. Re ine rt, Me asuringIqbal ( unpubl ished manuscript) ( on file with author).
Ge lb ach labels this conundru m the "fund ame ntal e valuation prob le m." Ge lb ach, supra note 70, at
2295 (" [W ]e cannot k now what would have happe ned to case s that actua lly have MTD s fi led
unde r Conley had Twombly! Iqbal actua lly bee n in place, and so on. This quandary b oils d own to the
ob se rvation that it is impossib le to ob se rve what would happe n to the same unit of study in multiple
mutua lly e xclusive state s of the world ---a challe nge known in the e va luation me thod ology lite rature
as the fu nd ame nta l e valuationprob le m.").
See, e.g., Bone , supra note 10, at 88 7 ("If me ritle ss plaintiffs in a large treb le -d amage s class action are
ab le to ge t past the ple ad ing stage and use the thre at of d iscove ry to leve rage a large se ttle me nt, the
re sult might d isrupt competition in the te le communications marke t, which would be d ire ctly
contrary to antitrust goa ls."); see also, e.g., Be ll Atl. Corp . v. Twomb ly , 550 U.S. 544, 546 ( 2007)
(" The re quire me nt of a lle gations sugge sting an agree me nt se rve s the pra ctica l purp ose of preve nting
a plaintiff with ' a large ly ground le ss claim' from 'tak[ing] up the time of a numbe r of othe r pe ople,
with the right to do so repre se nting an in terrorem incre me nt of the se ttle me nt value ."' (alte ration in
original)).
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d iscovery until they can pay the new price of admission-a demonstration of factual
support sufficient to render their claims plausible. Perhaps Professor D ouglas
Smith best expressed this view when he wrote:
The Court's recent pleading decisions recognize that, as the costs
of litigation increase and the scope of discovery expands, the need for
more stringent pleading standards increases. It is neither efficient nor
fair to allow claims of dubious merit to proceed when doing so may lead
to settlements that are not based on the underlying merits, but rather
the potential costs associated with defending a lawsuit in our modern
civil justice system. Iqbal thus presents a further evolution in the
pleading standard that is likely to increase the efficiency and fairness of
modern civil practice.82

First, the Court has not established that the discovery abuse about which it
is concerned is a real problem in actual cases, or at least in a significant number of
cases. In support of its theory of discovery abuse, the Court indicated that
discovery costs were "unusually high" in antitrust cases83 and that discovery
accounts for "as much as 90 percent of the litigation costs in the cases where
discovery is actively employed. "84 The former point was based on a citation to a
student law review note that itself did not cite or engage in any study to back up
the claim of higher discovery costs in antitrust cases.85 However, even if it turned
out that the statement was accurate, that would establish a problem for antitrust
claims, not all types of claims. Thus, if antitrust discovery abuse is the problem,
the solution should be tailored to that specific context. The latter point the
Twombly Court made about the costs of discovery, of course, tells us nothing: If
discovery accounts for 90 percent of litigation costs, that does not mean that the
costs are high as an absolute matter. Further, there is no clarity in what the Court
meant by limiting the figu re to cases in which discovery is "actively employed. "
The source of the Court's figu re, a memorandum from the Chair of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules to the Chair of the Standing Committee, stated:
[T]he Committee learned that in almost 40% of federal cases,
discO'Very is not used at all, and in an additional substantialpercentage of
82.
83.
84.
85.

Smith, supra note 26, at 1055.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citing William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect rfOne-Way Fee
Shifting on DiscoveryAbuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898- 99 (2003)).
Id at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules,
to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192
F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)).
See Wagener, supra note 83, at 1898- 99 ("[C]ourts typically permit antitrust discovery to range
further (and costs to run higher) than in most other cases.").

1730

60 UCLA L. REV. 1 7 10 (2013)

cases, only about three hours ofdiscovery occurs. In short, the discovery
rules are relevant to only a limited portion of cases in which discovery is
actively employed by the parties. In these cases, however, discovery was
often thought to be too expensive, and concerns about undue expense
were expressed by both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys. The Com
mittee learned that the cost of discovery represents approximately 50%
of the litigation costs in all cases, and as much as 90% of the litigation
costs in the cases where discovery is actively employed.86
So the very source cited by the Court in support of its claim of a discovery
problem itself admits that discovery is nonexistent in 40 percent of the cases and is
limited to three hours in a substantial additional percentage of cases; the 90
percent figure represents what might be taking place at the margins.87 Using that
information to generalize an assertion of a discovery abuse problem warranting
system-wide revision to pleading standards is dubious to say the least. Although
Professor Linda Mullenix famously debunked what she called "The Pervasive
Myth ofPervasive Discovery Abuse,"88 the myth clearly continues to hold sway.

86 .

87 .

88 .

Memorandum from Paul V. Ni emeyer, Chair, Advi sor y Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony
Sciri ca, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Pr actice and Pr ocedure, supra note 84, at 357 ( emphasi s
added). The Feder al Judi cial Center engaged i n a study of di scover y pr acti ces ahead of the cited
Advi sor y Committee report i n whi ch i t stated the fol lowing:
E mpir ical r esear ch about discover y i n ci vi l li tigati on has yi elded results that
differ fr om the conventional wisdom, whi ch clai ms that di scover y i s abusi ve, time
consuming, unpr oducti ve, and too costly. In contrast to thi s pi cture of discover y,
empirical r esearch over the last three decades has shown consi stently that
volumi nous di scover y tends to be related to case char acteri stics such as complexity
and case type, that the typi cal case has relatively litt le discover y, conducted at costs
that are pr oporti onate to the stakes of the li tigation, and that di scover y gener ally-
but wi th notable excepti ons- yields i nformation that ai ds i n the just di sposi tion of
cases. The results of the FJC study r epor ted i n thi s Article are, for the most par t,
consi stent with those findi ngs.
Thomas E. W illgi ng et al., An Empirical Study ofDiscovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993
FederalRuleA mendments , 39 B. C. L. REV. 525, 527 ( 1998) (fo otnotes omi tted).
Memorandum from Paul V. Ni emeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony
J. Scirica, Chai r, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 84, at 357; see als o Linda S.
Mulleni x, Th e Pervasive Myth ofPervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B. C. L. REV. 683, 683
( 1998) ("[T] he studi es reaffirm our common sense notions about di scovery- that complex, high
stakes liti gation, handled by bi g firms with cor porate cli ents, are the cases most li kely to i nvolve the
problematic di scovery that skews th e discovery debate. ").
Li nda S. Mulleni x, Discovery in Disarray: The P ervasive Myth ofPervasive Discovery Abuse and the
Consequences far Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN . L. REV. 1393, 1396 ( 1994) ("[T] he massi ve
di scovery refo rm agenda un leashed si multaneously through the Advisory Committee on Ci vil
Rules, the CJRA, and executive br anch order s i s based on questionable social sci ence, ' cosmi c
anecdote, ' and pervasi ve, medi a-per petuated myths." ( footnote omi tt ed)).

J.
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The Federal Judicial Center has since conducted a more recent study of
discovery in civil litigation, yielding remarkably similar results failing to dem
onstrate a discovery cost or abuse problem across all or even most cases.89 One
commentator recounted the FJC's presentation of its results at a 2010 Duke Civil
Litigation Conference:
The Duke Civil Litigation Conference opened with a panel
presenting the empirical data that had been compiled expressly to shed
light on the conference's concerns with electronic discovery, cost, and
delay. Yet when the researchers from the Federal Judicial Center (FJC)
took their seats that morning, their findings were not as expected. To
the disbelief of many at this venerable gathering, the FJC reported
that the median cost of litigation for defendants was $20,000,
including attorneys' fees. For plaintiffs, the median cost was even less,
at $15,000, with some reporting costs ofless than $1600. Only at the
ninety- fifth percentile did reported costs reach $280,000 for plaintiffs
and $300,000 for defendants. The median estimate of stakes in the
litigation for plaintiffs was $160,000, with estimates ranging from
$15,000 at the tenth percentile to almost $4 million at the ninety-fifth
percentile. The median estimate of the stakes by defendants' attorneys
was $200,000, with estimates ranging from $15,000 at the tenth
percentile to $5 million at the ninety-fifth percentile. Furthermore, the
discovery costs that animated the Duke Conference organizers and
participants did not appear to be, in the vast majority of cases,
significant or disproportionate. The FJC study found that the median
percentage of litigation costs incurred in discovery was twenty percent
for plaintiffs and twenty- seven percent for defendants. Perhaps most
surprising was the finding that, at the median, the reported costs of
discovery, including attorneys' fees, constituted 1.6% of the reported
stakes for plaintiffs and 3.3% ofthe reported stakes for defendants.90

These numbers speak for themselves; pleading reform in the interest of
combating discovery cost and abuse looks like a solution in search of a problem.
Moving beyond whether the concerns identified by the Court are real or
imagined, the efficiency argument that plausibility pleading is a good thing also
fails because the doctrine as articulated is poorly designed to achieve the

89.

90.

EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT
TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2009), http://
www.fjc.gov/publidpd£nsfi1ookup/dissurvl .pdil$file/dissurvl .pd£
Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil justice Reform: Its Fallacies and
Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1088- 89 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
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screening goal it espouses.91 As I said at the outset of this piece and as I have
written before, plausibility pleading is overinclusive92 and hopelessly subjective.93
A complaint that has enough facts to make entitlement to relief a possibility but
not enough to render it plausible is not one that anyone can rightly label
frivolous, meritless, or even dubious, at least not solely on the basis of the
plausibility analysis. I ndeed, the fact that liability is possible is acknowledged
under the standard; possibility, however, no longer suffices. 94 After seeing Iqbal
and not liking the result, Professor Robert Bone-a Twombly defender
acknowledged that plausibility pleading "risks screening meritorious suits"95 and
that the policy case for doing so, at least in cases li ke Iqbal, is "uncertain. "96
Perhaps arguments can be made that raising the pleading bar to block potentially
meritorious claims is justifiable under certain circumstances. But neither the
Court nor any commentator has made the case that the costs to defendants, to
the litigation system, or to substantive legal concerns of permitting such claims to
go forward are so great as to warrant denying a prospective litigant meaningful
access to the courts, either in particular substantive contexts or across all cases
generally. And as Professor Bone has suggested, there are better ways to protect
these interests: "[E] ven in Iqbal, strict pleading might not have been the best way
to achieve an optimal policy balance. The lower courts offered a promising
alternative: thin screening followed by limited access to discovery before
subjecting the case to a more aggressive screening approach. "97 Professors Y eazell
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Professor Fitzpatrick has been critical ofthe Twombly/Iqbal solution to the discovery problem. See
Fitzpatrick, supr a note 45, at 1643 ("This is not to say, however, that the regulatory mechanism the
Court selected to tighten the spigot on discovery- pleading standards- is the best one. Pleading
standards empower judges who have neither the information nor the incentives to make wise
decisions about which cases are worthy ofdiscovery.").
See supra note 7.
See supra note 8.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545-46 (2007) ("A parallel conduct allegation gets the §
1 complaint close to stating a claim, but without further factual enhancement it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility.").
Bone, supra note 11, at 879 ("[S]trict pleading will screen some meritorious suits, even ones with a
high probability of trial success but a probability that is not evident at the pleading stage before
access to discovery.").
Id at 881.
Id at 878-81; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) ("Rule 26 [of the Federal
Rules ofCivil Procedure] vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and
to dictate the sequence of discovery."). This is the approach the district court proposed to take in
Iqbal. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *21
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) ('The personal involvement, if any, of the non- MDC defendants
should be the subject of the initial stage of discovery. Accordingly, discovery concerning Ashcroft,
the FBI Defendants (Mueller, Maxwell, and Rolince), and the BOP Defendants (Sawyer,
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and Clermont have alluded to the possibility of beefed-up enforcement of Rule
1 1 as an alternative.98 Justice Stevens was not short of ideas beyond pleading
stringency in his Twombly dissent.99 To target pleading standards-the very
front end of the system-as the solution to a perceived problem with discovery
seems misguided.
Additionally, the subjectivity of the plausibil ity standard cannot be denied.
What does plausibility mean? All we know is that it means more than possibility
and less than probability,100 if even that much is clear. 101 As the understanding of
this amorphous term will vary from judge to judge, inconsistent and inappropriate
applications of the doctrine are inevitable.102 Further, the plausibility determi
nation depends on having judges apply their own understanding of what is
"normal" or "ordinary'' behavior for various actors-using, in Justice Kennedy's
words, their 'J udicial experience and common sense"103-as the lens through
which they determine whether a plaintiffs allegations describe a factual scenario

98 .
99 .

100.

101.

102 .

103.

Cook sey, and Rardin) wil l be general ly l imited to inquiries into their involvement in the al leged
denials of due process.") .
See Clermont & Yeaz ell , supra note 9, at 8 49 ("[O] ne could have less disruptively attained an
equivalent of the Twombly andIqbal regime by aggressively rereading Rule 11 rather than Rule 8 .") .
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("T hose concern s merit careful case
management, including strict control of discovery, carefu l scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage, and lucid instructions to juries; they do not, however, justify the dism issal of an
adequately pleaded complaint without even requiring the defendants to file answers deny ing a
charg e that they in fa ct engaged in collective decisionmak ing.") .
A shcroft v. I qbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 09) ('T he plausibil ity standard is not ak in to a 'probabil ity
requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibil ity that a defendant has acted unlawfull y.") ;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ("A sk ing fo r plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probabil ity requirement at the pleading stage . . . .") .
Judge Posner has opined that there is no clarity in the Court' s possibil ity plausibi
l ity-probabil ity
trichotomy, writing as fol lows:
The Court said inIqbal that the "plausibility standard is not akin to a 'prob
abil ity requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer possibil ity that a defendant has
acted unlawfully." This is a l ittle unclear because plausibil ity, probabil ity, and
possibil ity overlap. Probabil ity runs the gamut fr om a ze ro l ikel ihood to a certainty.
W hat is impossible has a z ero l ik elihood of occurring and what is plausible has a
moderately high likel ihood of occurring. The fa ct that the al legations undergirding
a claim could be true is no longer enough to save a complaint from being
dismissed; the complaint must establish a nonnegligible probability that the
claim is valid; but the probability need not be as great as such terms as
"preponderance of the evidence" connote.
In re Text Messaging A ntitrust L itig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation om itted) .
Clermont & Yeaz ell , supra note 9, at 8 41-42 ('T he second step of measuring plausibil ity seems
even more obviously unclear. This measure l ies entirely in the mind of the beholder. A nd the
multitude of beholders, wearing judicial robes, has precious l ittl e interp retive guidance given the
measure's novelty in the law." (footnote om itted)) .
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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suggestive of wrongdoing. 1 04 This is, by definition, a subjective assessment
because it is based on opinion rather than fact. I n other words, given the con
cession by the Court in both Twombly and Iqbal that the allegations were consistent
with liability on the part of the defendants, the Court applied its opinion prefer
encing lawful explanations above unlawful ones based solely on its own
speculation regarding which of the two was more likely. Were the described
events flatly inconsistent with liability, that would have been an objective
determination that would have legitimately supported dismissals in those cases.
But a pronouncement that "this could have been unlawful but we're not con
vinced because what you describe is more often the product of normal, lawful
conduct'' is not the blocking of unmeritorious claims, but the blocking of merely
questionable ones.
What is wrong with screening out merely questionable claims? Once we
make normalcy in the eyes of the judge the standard against which allegations of
wrongdoing are evaluated, we perversely disadvantage challenges to the very
deviance our laws prohibit. A civil claim is all about deviation from the norm,
which has happened many times in history-even at the hands of good capitalist
enterprises and high-ranking government officials. While businesses and govern
ment officials may normally not do the wrong thing, sometimes (or perhaps
often) they do. 1 05 When that happens, they certainly are not going to leave clear
breadcrumbs for outsiders to expose them. All we may see are the fruits of their
wrongdoing, which in tum will be all that can be alleged in a complaint. Without
the opportunity to initiate an action that asserts deviance in the context of
seemingly normal behavior, such wrongdoing will go undiscovered and
unpunished. A llowing such claims to move forward does not have to mean that
the floodgates to abusive discovery are opened. Courts can and should force
plaintiffs with questionable claims to identify the narrow areas that they would

104. Bone describes this as comparing plaintiffs' claims against a "baseline of normality." Bone, supra note
10, at 878 ("[T]he Court's plausibility standard . . . requires no more than that the allegations describe
a state of affairs that differs significantly from a baseline of normality and supports a probability of
wrongdoing greater than the background probability for situations of the same general type."). I
have described Twombly as requiring "the presentation of a factual scenario that possesses a
presumption of impropriety based on objective facts and supported implications." Spencer, supra
note 7, at 18.
105. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 591 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Many years ago a truly great economist
perceptively observed that '[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance
to raise prices."' (alteration in original) (quoting 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
117 CT- M. Dent & Sons ed. 1960) (1776))).
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need to explore to make their claims more tenable before further discovery is
permitted. 1 06 Judges could also use their authority to shift the costs of such
discovery to minimize the burden on defendants at this stage. 107 But shutting
down such claims ab initio is not the right approach. And doing it through
judicial reinterpretation just makes it even worse, given the legitimacy and
disruption concerns outlined above. 1 08
CONCLUSION

Both the substance of the plausibility doctrine and the means by which it
has been imposed are indefensible, assuming one cares about enabling private
litigants to vindicate substantive law violations through the courts. Certainly, as
Professor Bone reminds us, defendants have a right "to be free from liability when
the substantive law so provides," and that can serve as a counterweight to the rights
of plaintiffs to have legitimate claims vindicated. 109 However, no one can seriously
claim that requiring an answer to a complaint-and perhaps some limited
discovery-is the equivalent of imposing liability on innocent defendants. Thus,
invoking pleading doctrine as a means to protect such defendants is undeniable
overkill.
To the extent that Twiqbal defenders have faith in plausibility pleading as
something that will be useful in helping to weed out unmeritorious claims, they
refuse to learn the lessons of the past, just as Charles Clark predicted and la
mented. 1 10 The combination of requiring facts raising the prospect of liabil ity

106. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front L oading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-dismissal Discovery Can
A ddress the Detri mental Effect eflqbal on Civil Rights Cases, l 4 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 69
(2010) ("Although courts should continue to guard against 'fishing expeditions,' they should also be
open, upon receipt of a Rule 12(6)(6) motion, to allowing plaintiffs some initial discovery focused
on those discrete facts necessary to show a plausible claim. This way, discovery would be loaded
towards the front end of the lawsuit, and would be doing heavy lifung of a different kind
determining the lawsuit's viability rather than its underlying merits. ").
107. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(6).
108. See supra Part II.A.
109. Bone, supra note 10, at 913; see also Celotex Coip. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Rule 56
must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses
that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the
rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by
the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.").
110. Clark, sup ra note 37, at 46--47 ("I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading
cannot be made to do the service of trial and that live issues between active litigants are not to be
disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings, i.e., the formalistic claims of the parties. Experience
has found no quick and easy short cut for trials in cases generally and antitrust cases in particular.
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beyond the speculative level to that of plausibility and empowering judges to
disregard what they deem to be legal conclusions rather than factual assertions,
makes plausibility pleading no better than the very fact-based code pleading
system the Federal Rules replaced. 1 1 1 If the abandoned code pleading system can
be described as "nineteenth-century judges [who] applied the code rules in a
hyp er-technical fashion, insisting on 'strict and logical accuracy' and drawing
hopeless distinctions among allegations of ultimate fact, legal conclusions, and
evidentiary facts, "1 12 how is pleading post-Iqbal much different? Justice Kennedy
saw conclusions (the allegation of policy design and approval) where Justice
Souter saw facts;1 13 Justice Souter saw conclusions (the allegation of an
agreement) where Justice Stevens saw facts. 1 14 Who is right? What will the
judge in your next case see?1 15
It is interesting that as one looks across the landscape of Twiqbal apologies,
Twombly and Iqbal are simultaneously downplayed as inconsequential but de
fended as necessary to fight discovery abuse and extortionate settlements. They
can't be both. But such duplicity, in truth, is telling. The liberal ethos of the
Rules is an important part of their legitimacy. Overt and honest efforts to ratchet
back their open-access orientation are difficult to achieve; this may be because it is
very difficult to sell procedural revisions that explicitly move in an access
restricting direction and that do so unapologetically in the interest of defendants
at the expense of aggrieved prospective plaintiffs. Thus, the most substantial
antiaccess procedural reforms have occurred through judicial reinterpretation of
the Rules, reliably combined with assurances that (1) nothing has changed
doctrinally and (2) there will be or has been no impact of the interpretation in

111 .
112 .
113.
114 .
115 .

Much time an d e xpen se , waste motion an d inj ustice have gone in to the attempt, b ut expe rience is
wholl y cle ar that such q uickie justice al ways b reaks down . . . .") .
See Mi lle r, supra n ote 4, at 2 0 ( de scrib in g the ple adin g stan dard e stab lishe d b y Twomb{y and Iqbal as
" [i]n re ality . .. a form of fact ple ading b y an othe r n ame ").
Bone , supra n ote 10 , at 8 91.
A shcroft v. Iqb al, 556U.S. 662 , 68 1, 698 (2 0 0 9) .
Be ll A tl. Co. v. Twombl y, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 590 (2 0 0 7) .
Alex Re ine rt, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 1, 10 (2 0 12)
("[L] owe r courts have disagree d as to whe the r allegation s whic h fail to distingu ish amon g
de fen dan ts are b y de finition c oncl usory or n ot.") .
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question, 1 16 while the rhetoric behind the reinterpretation roots itself in the need
to protect defendants against frivolous or doubtful claims. 117
As I have written previously, Twombly and Iqbal are part of a series of cases
moving civil procedure in a restrictive direction. 1 1 8 From summary judgment, 1 1 9
to pleading, to personal jurisdiction, 120 to class action doctrine, 121 the Court has
reinterpreted procedural rules in ways that protect corporate or government de
fendants against suits by individual plaintiffs. Some may believe that is a good
thing. I tend to disagree. But if restrictiveness is the chosen course, those who
espouse it should be decent and courageous enough to clearly articulate that vi
sion and advance it through the rulemaking and legislative process on those
terms, so that the rationale and approach can be publicly defended and debated.
I, for one, would pursue the abandonment of plausibility pleading by urging the
rulemakers to restore notice pleading122 and revise other complementary Rules
such as Rules 9(6) (particularity requirement), 11 (certification requirement), 12(e)
(motion for a more definite statement), 16 G udicial case management), 26
(discovery in general), 37 (discovery sanctions), and the Official Forms-to de
velop a more thoughtful, comprehensive, and effective approach to controlling
initiation of actions and access to discovery.
At the outset of this Conclusion, I noted that plausibility pleading is inde
fensible, "assuming one cares about enabling private litigants to vindicate substan
tive law violations through the courts. " Ultimately, it may be that some defenders
116 . See, e. g. , JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TRENDS IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PRACTICE: 1975- 2000, at 23- 24 ( 2007) , http:// www.fj c.g ov/pu blic/ pd£n s6'looku p/t:r sj prll 7.pdfi'
$fil e/ t:r sj prll 7.pdf (finding that the rate of filing an d g ran ting surnrrnuy ju dgmen t motion s "gen erally
changed veiy li ttle after the [ Celotex] tri logy" ).
117 . See, e.g. , C elotex C orp. v. C atrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 ( 1986) ( "Rule 56 mu st be con stru ed with du e
reg ard n ot only for the rights of person s asserting claims an d defen ses that are adequ ately based in
fact to have those claims an d defen ses tried to a juiy, bu t also fo r the rig hts of person s opposing su ch
claims and defen ses . . . . ").
118 . E. g. , A. Ben jamin Spen cer, ClassActions, Heightened Common ality, and Declining Access toJustice, 93
B.U. L . REV. 441, 475 - 78 ( 2013) (describing this tren d) ; A. Ben jamin Spen cer, The Restrictive
Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH . L .REV. 353 (2010).
119 . Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; An derson v. L iberty Lo bby, In c., 477 U. S. 242, 257 ( 1986) ; Matsu shita
E lec. Indu s. C o. v. Z en ith Radio C orp ., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986) .
120. J. McIn tyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. C t. 2780 (2011) ( denying person al ju risdi cti on over a
defen dan t who in directl y shipped a produ ct cau sing harm to the plain tiff in the fo rum state).
121 . Wal-Mart Stores, In c. v. Dukes, 131 S. C t. 2541 (2011) (in terpreting the " common qu estion s"
requ iremen t of Ru le 23( a) to requ ire common qu estion s that are central to the litig ation).
1 22. A possible way to do this wou ld be to amen d Ru le 8(a) (2) to read "a short and plain statemen t of
the claim showing the possibi li ty of reli ef " Note that su ch a revision wou ld have to be
accompani ed by chang es to the other ru les enu merated in the text.
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of Twombly and Iqbal simply do not fully embrace that goal. My hope is that this
goal can at least be kept in mind as the Supreme Court and others who influence
federal civil procedure interpret and apply plausibility pleading going forward.
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APPENDIX

V I R G i N I A:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF AMHERST
Plaintiff,

HOLLY BRANHAM,
v.

DOLGEN CORP, INC.
d/b/a/ Dollar General Store
a Kentucky ColJ)OratiOn
SERVICE REGISTERED AGENT
Corporation Service Company
1 1 South 12th Street
Richmond, Virginia 232 1 9

0 9 0 0 7 4 4 9

Defendant.

COMPLAINT
I.

On June 8, 2007, the Plaintiff, was severely and permanently injured when she fell a1 Dollar General Store at
171 Ambriar Plaza in Amherst Cmmty, Virginia. The store was owned and operated by the Defendant and
employees and agents ofthe Defendant.

2. The Plaintiff fell due to the negligence of the Defendants agents and employees who negligently failed to
remove the liquid from the floor and had negligently failed to place warning signs to alert and warn the
Plaintiff of the wet floor. The Defendants thru its employees breached their duty to warn the Plaintiff of the
dangerous wet floor.
3.

As a direct result of the negligence of the Defendants agents and employees, acting in the scope of their
employment, the Plaintiff was severely and pennanently injured. She lost many of the pleasures of life. She
suffered pain. She has incurred medical and hospital bills. Her ability to earn an income was dissipated.

4. The Plaintiffseeks a judgment in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) against the
Defundant.
HOLLY BRANHAM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
Robert S. Ganey, Esq.
P.O. Box 1 74
Hanover, VA 23069
(804) 627-2723
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